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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

An Introduction to Psychology. By MARY WHITON CALKINS.
New York, The Macmillan Company, 1901.—pp. xv, 509.

This is a decidedly good book. And to make this statement about any text-book of psychology that ventures to enter the field of competition at the present time is already to give it high praise. The qualities that constitute this excellence are numerous. What immediately strikes one in a first rapid examination of the book is, perhaps, that it contains within its covers much that certain popular text-books see fit to omit. For example, one finds in the body of the text good cuts of eye and ear accompanied by brief descriptions, and in the Appendix a first-rate account of the brain, together with cuts illustrating its development, anatomy, and localization of function. Then, too, any one giving a first course in psychology wishes to say a word at least about such topics as comparative psychology, child psychology, social psychology, and some of the more instructive features of abnormal psychology. And it is certainly desirable to have these presented in concise form within easy reach of the student. One should wish too, it seems to the present writer, that the impression be left on the student's mind that such topics as the above are not mere side issues from which illustrative material may be drawn, but that they are legitimate domains of inquiry within the larger field. At the same time, their distinctive difference of method, the more or less complete desertion of the way of introspection, should be kept clear. Now all this the author has very successfully accomplished by according separate chapters to these matters, where they are presented in brief but systematic form, with the main lines of difference between them and the matters treated in the body of the book kept constantly before the reader. Then, most novel and gratifying of all, there is a chapter on the "History of Psychological Systems" which gives a compact but illuminating outline of just those great movements of thought that the elementary student should know. An Appendix is added which is really a condensed book of reference. Here, besides the pages referred to above on the Anatomy and Physiology of the Brain, are to be found sections on Aphasia, on Color Theories, on Theories of the Attention, etc. There is also a short contribution by Miss Gamble on "The Physical and the Physiological Conditions of the Sensations of Smell." Thus, without seriously increasing the bulk of the volume, many subjects are

succinctly treated for which the instructor is frequently forced to refer students to special books—a method that turns out most unsatisfactorily where large classes are concerned.

But the inclusion of so much necessarily involves the exclusion of much else that many would regard as indispensable. There is, for instance, no treatment of the theoretical problem of psychical measurement. The phenomena of after-images and visual contrasts are mentioned in the Appendix only. For reaction experiments one is referred to the Bibliography. And one searches in vain for any chapters on sections which deal with the facts usually included under the heads of *The Perception of Space* and *The Perception of Time*. That a stereoscope has psychological value, or that there are such phenomena as geometrical optical illusions, are not to be known from a reading of the book. Now while these and other omissions are, seemingly, to be greatly regretted, they all have their reason apparently in the purpose of the author to consistently disregard the explicit description of experimental methods and results. This does not mean that she herself is not keenly alive to these matters. On the contrary, every discussion implies the constant reliance upon and expectation of the experimental test. Only for the ends of this book it is rather the discussion of the theoretical question, or the result of introspection unaided by experimentation, that is important. Thus the question of sensation-extensities is of greater moment than that of the visual factors in the perception of solidity, and the discussion of how a past experience may be recognized is given the right of way over the statement of results gained by an experimental examination of the time-consciousness. This apparent neglect of experimental data is made good in part by constant footnote references to the manuals of Sanford and Titchener, and by an excellent Bibliography at the end of the volume.

Upon examining the book somewhat more carefully, a second quality appears, which, in the opinion of the present writer, should belong to every book of this sort. This quality is gained by the persistent refusal to be rigidly dogmatic or to remain insensible to rival claims and theories. At almost every step the reader is allowed to take a brief view of the chief divergent opinions. Thus he gets a glimpse, at least, of the actual psychological world with all its wealth of discussion and critical probing. This method is in conspicuous contrast to that of a certain rather popular text-book, in the Preface to which its author distinctly affirms his conviction “that the main thing in teaching elementary psychology is to give one’s pupils a system,”

whether right or wrong mattering little, since errors can be corrected. This conviction seems to rest partly upon the erroneous belief that any other treatment results in giving the student "a mere medley of conflicting opinion, a hodge-podge of psychological analysis, logical classification, and epistemological interpretation." Now, of course, a text-book is not primarily the place for controversial writing, but that there is a middle course between dreary dogmatism and polemical side-excursion is sufficiently proved by the book before us. Here the untried reader may catch sight of many divergent, and, for the moment, perhaps equally attractive paths. But he runs little risk of straying, for he is carefully advised by the author of the road which she herself, at least, prefers to follow. This course is no less deliberate than in the case of the text-book mentioned above. Only here the controlling conviction is that "a man's reach should exceed his grasp."

With this feature of the book the present writer is in hearty sympathy. Writers of text-books too often seem to presume that their books are to be read apart from the comments of a properly qualified instructor—as if the reader were to be left helpless in the midst of the materials offered him. But the presence of an instructor is as much to be reckoned with as that of the pupil, and when the former, to preserve his mental integrity, finds himself compelled again and again to make vigorous protests against some of the unqualified statements of the text, there is likely to be bred in the pupil's mind a growing distrust of an author who can write so dogmatically upon topics so obviously debatable. Such topics would be the Hering color theory, or the existence of an auditory space, or the number of the affective qualities. Distrust in a text-book is ruinous to a pupil, but the instructor can more readily change his text-book than surrender his convictions. The volume before us allows for divergence of opinion, but through clear statements of existing differences the reader is conducted to definite solutions.

It is perhaps largely due to this second feature of which we have been speaking that the book is pervaded by a strong personal note. This I should mention as a third quality which a relatively superficial examination reveals. The reader is admitted very largely into the confidence of the writer. Not that this is forced upon him. Quite the contrary. This admission to confidence lies rather in the genial, individual atmosphere surrounding the book—that atmosphere which Locke knew so well how to create, and for which James stands unsurpassed. Indeed, I know of no book which so successfully competes with the latter in this regard. Whether this is due to the heavy and

cheerfully acknowledged debt that she owes to James makes little difference. The atmosphere is there. Not only is one permitted a glimpse at the various opinions and the definite writers who have helped most towards the formation of her own private views, but one is sure to share more or less in the author's past experiences and travels. Now one is in Trafalgar Square in search of an illustration, now one makes a momentary visit to Italy. Or in imagination one is accompanying the author along the streets of Boston, or sharing with her the scenes of Gloucester harbor. Or it may be a character in a modern novel, or a bit of classic verse. It is all the same. The reader is not passing through the dreary desert of mere enumeration and classification. He is becoming acquainted with living mental processes in a richly personal way.

But the really significant features of the book lie much deeper. Stated in a word, they consist, first, in the thoroughgoing application of the author's doctrine of conscious elements, and, second, in the treatment of all concrete conscious experiences from two distinctly separated points of view—regarding them now as facts of consciousness analyzable into constituent elements, now as conscious experiences whose peculiarities result from the relations of the experiencing self to some other self or selves. Let us glance at each of these features separately.

(a) Readers acquainted with the author's articles on the elements of consciousness,¹ will foresee what application a systematic text-book must make of the results there reached. Not the sensation with its attributes of quality, intensity, and extensity, but these attributes themselves are the ultimate elements. Thus 'brightness' and 'loudness' are as truly elemental for the author as 'blue' or 'C.' 'Duration' is not admitted as an elementary state, because it is either "reflectively 'added' to the sensation, or else it is a complex psychic content."² In the book itself the present writer is unable to find any discussion or statement of this point. Duration is ignored, and the time-consciousness is recognized only in so far as it comes into relation with the "feeling of familiarity" and the "feeling of anticipatoriness," which are respectively the characterizing features of recognition and volition.

So much for the 'sensational' elements. Next come the 'attributive' elements, which include, besides the usually admitted processes of pleasantness and unpleasantness, a further element resembling

¹ *Psych. Rev.*, VI, p. 506, and VII, p. 377.

² *Loc. cit.*, p. 511.

these, the "feeling of realness." This latter, the author claims, is a true elemental state, to be classed with the affective processes because like them it is dependent upon other processes in consciousness, and, also like them, is not invariably present.

But the most radical departure from orthodox procedure is to be found in the enumeration and systematic application of "relational" elements. Though the fact that these are denied by many writers is clearly enough recognized, there is no hesitation in accepting them here as genuine realities with which one may operate in the explanation of mental complexes. In accepting these elements as constituents of conscious life, the author leans heavily upon James's doctrine of "transitive" states, but like Meinong and others makes use of a broader term. In agreement with Meinong, too, she holds that the failure to accord recognition to these states is due in large part to their introspective elusiveness. Without attempting an exhaustive enumeration of these elements, it is suggested that the feelings of 'one' and of 'many,' of 'connection' and of 'opposition,' of 'more' and of 'less,' of 'like' and of 'different,' are certainly elemental, while the feeling of 'familiarity' analyzes into the simpler feeling of 'same' and of 'past,' the latter in turn being still further analyzable. It is these relational elements that allow the introduction of ready distinctions among complex processes. Thus a percept is escorted by the vague "feeling of combination"; comparison by the "feelings of likeness and difference"; while the general notion and the judgment are defined as primarily percepts or images supplemented by a "feeling of generality," itself a compound of the feelings of "likeness" and of "wholeness." These illustrations will serve to exhibit the author's general method of exposition in this particular. In the opinion of the present writer, this use of relational elements has the advantage not only of great clearness of exposition, but, what is more important, of being true to little recognized conscious realities. That the usual analysis of all consciousness into sensational and affective states is unsatisfactory seems to be attested by the attempt in certain quarters to find a multiplicity of affective states, by the attempt elsewhere to establish the reality of "form qualities," and by the unexpressed craving on the part of many for some way, more convincing than the ordinary one, of accurately characterizing such states as the "concept-consciousness" and the "recognition-consciousness." To be the first to operate systematically with these elements is to do a service for which all psychologists should be deeply grateful.

(*b*) The second significant feature mentioned above is due to the fulfilment of one of the author's main purposes in writing this book. And what gives the book in large part its distinctive quality is just this double treatment of our consciousness, as, on the one hand, a dead organism to be reduced by dissection to its constituent elements, and, on the other, as a sum of living, pulsating experiences which have their sources in the relationships between conscious selves. To approach the mental life from either one of these points of view is no new thing. What is decidedly novel here is the demonstration that both modes of treatment may stand side by side without danger of being confounded, and with all the advantages of uniting the analytic treatment and all the training in introspection which this unquestionably affords, with that presentation which gives us back our actual experiences, not distorted by methodological artificialities but in richly interpreted form. This is one of the factors that will go a long way towards making this an acceptable text-book. As an illustration of the application of this twofold method we may note the contrast between "percept" and "perceiving." The former is, as it were, static, to be taken to pieces, coldly and impersonally. The latter is the living process whose mark of differentiation from imagination is that it may be shared with other perceivers. So we find everywhere such contrasts as "image" and "imagining," "thought" and "thinking," "volition" and "will," "belief" and "faith." In discussing the emotions, a neat classification is permitted by the fact that the relations between selves may here be divided into "the imperious or egoistic, and the sympathetic or adoptive." Thus, happiness may be entirely dependent upon the attitude of another, but at the same time be egregiously selfish. Or, on the other hand, though no less dependent upon the attitude of another, the happiness may be entirely the result of a sympathetic sharing of experiences. All this is set forth in an entertainingly written chapter. This same distinction between the imperious and the adoptive attitudes forms the chief line of division between "will" and "faith."

A word should be said about the author's terminology in the exposition of these two significant features of the book just noticed. As will have been noted, the word "feeling" is used after the traditional English fashion adopted by James. Possibly the poverty of our psychological vocabulary compels this. But it is certainly to be regretted that the term "idea" is employed in the broad Lockian sense of any "fact of consciousness," of whatever elements—sensational, attributive, or relational—it may be composed. It certainly seems monstrous

to call an emotion an idea, but to such lengths is the author constrained by the attempt to briefly characterize the contrasting modes of treatment adopted,—“idea-psychology” and “self-psychology” being the terms of the antithesis. Of course, the author explains and partially defends this nomenclature, and in reading the book itself no confusion is felt. But it is none the less to be regretted that a more universally accepted term could not have been chosen.

It is obviously beyond the scope of this review to indicate in detail the points where one may most readily challenge the author's opinion. A few of these however may be noted. Not every one would admit that it is legitimate to regard attention “as a simple relational experience, that of clearness,” in other words, that clearness is the “attention-element.” And many would be far from assenting to the statement that “being interested and attending are one and the same thing.” Many too, I fancy, would dissent vigorously from the identification of memory with fidelity of reproduction, regardless of the *recognition* of this reproduction as the recurrence of a past experience. But, for the author, “exactness of repetition” suffices to turn mere reproductive imagination into memory.

Obviously, one may dissent *in toto* from the doctrine of elements that pervades the entire volume, and one may be entirely out of sympathy with the dual point of view adopted. For such a one this is not the ideal text-book. But those who find here doctrines congenial to their own tendencies of thought will have no hesitation in recommending this book to an honest and cordial trial as a guiding text for classes in psychology. No perfect text-book of psychology has yet been written. And this as well as others has its peculiar faults, some of which have been briefly indicated. But, all in all, the present writer regards this as the best text-book that has yet appeared. Its subsequent use with his own classes will alter or confirm this opinion.

Naturally, the various chapters are of unequal merit. But to the writer those on “Thought,” considered both independently and in comparison with similar chapters in other books, are perhaps the best in the volume. Certain pages of the chapter on the “Emotions” are most excellent, and the section on “The Religious Consciousness,” as one of the typical personal relations, deserves high commendation. The exposition of the various color theories, both in the body of the text and in the Appendix, are the best that we yet have in compact form.

The typography of the book is excellent. Not a single typographical error has been noticed, though the name of the anthropologist,

Tylor, is persistently misspelled in the several places where it occurs.

A well chosen Bibliography and an index of unusual clearness close the volume.

A. H. PIERCE.

SMITH COLLEGE.

A Student's History of Philosophy. BY ARTHUR KENYON ROGERS.

The Macmillan Co., New York, 1901.—pp. ix, 519.

Considering the quantity and quality of the published products of the scholastic world, one is reminded of Johnson's characterization of a literary friend, as having an enormous appetite but a bad digestion. In the department of philosophy, taken in a broad sense, now and again a really good thing appears even from an esoteric point of view, but a large proportion of the output betrays an appetite that outstrips the powers of digestion and assimilation. Still it is to be remembered specific judgments differ, and it sometimes happens that the verdict of the grumbler is reversed in the court of public or academic opinion.

In *A Student's History of Philosophy*, Professor Rogers proposes to furnish what a student may fairly be expected to get from a college course; to emphasize the spirit in which each philosopher philosophized; to create certain broad general impressions, leaving further details to come from other sources; to use the writer's own words when literary interests supplement the philosophical; and to keep in mind the relation of individual systems to the general history of civilization by a mild use of the Hegelian philosophy of history. These prefatory avowals are supplemented by introductory remarks on the nature of the history of philosophy, and on primitive conceptions of the world. The latter point is insignificantly treated, but suggests the Hegelian historical moment, while the former lays down: "The History of Philosophy attempts to give an account of the more important and comprehensive of these conceptions," ("thing or substance, cause and effect, force, law, mechanism, necessity") "in terms of which we are accustomed to think of the world, and to trace the mental and social conditions out of which they took their rise. It is an account of the growth of man's power to formulate the universe." With this emphasis on concepts and man's power to formulate the universe, it is strange that we miss from the index any reference to force, energy, and mechanism. The author makes no effort to follow the Cartesian 'motion' through Spinoza into Leibniz. That Descartes postulated matter in motion, that Spinoza confessedly broke down in supposing it possible to deduce motion from extension, that